Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 4

Article 12

Fall 9-1-2013

The Promise of Plyler: Public Institutional In-State Tuition Policies
for Undocumented Students and Compliance with Federal Law
Nancy B. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nancy B. Anderson, The Promise of Plyler: Public Institutional In-State Tuition Policies for
Undocumented Students and Compliance with Federal Law, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2339
(2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol70/iss4/12
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Promise of Plyler: Public
Institutional In-State Tuition Policies
for Undocumented Students and
Compliance with Federal Law
Nancy B. Anderson∗
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................... 2340
II. In-State Tuition Law and Policy ................................... 2343
A. Current State Law................................................... 2343
B. Shifting Toward Institutional Policy ...................... 2346
1. Rhode Island Board of Governors ..................... 2350
2. Michigan: The University of Michigan.............. 2351
3. Colorado: Metropolitan State University
of Denver ............................................................ 2351
III. Federal Statutory Obstacles to Institutional Policy ..... 2354
A. IIRIRA Section 505.................................................. 2355
B. PRWORA Section 411 ............................................. 2357
1. The Text of Section 411 Indicates Reduced
Tuition Is Not a “State or Local Public
Benefit” .............................................................. 2359
2. Case Law Evaluating Section 411 Supports
This Interpretation ............................................ 2362
3. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411
is Inconsistent with Congressional Intent ........ 2365

∗ Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2014. Thank you to Professor Joan Shaughnessy and the Editorial Board of the
Washington and Lee Law Review for their guidance and assistance. Thank you
also to my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout
law school and always.

2339

2340

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2339 (2013)
4. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411
Is Inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
View of Public Education ................................... 2366

IV. Federal Courts Will Not Hear a Section 411 Claim ..... 2370
A. Statutory Enforcement of Personal Rights ............. 2371
1. Implied Private Rights of Action and § 1983
Claims ................................................................ 2371
2. Application to Other Cases Indicates No
Implied Private Right of Action Under
Section 411 ......................................................... 2373
3. The Text of Section 411 Indicates No Private
Right of Action ................................................... 2376
B. Sovereign Immunity and Standing Limitations ..... 2377
C. Constitutional Claims ............................................. 2379
V. A Possible Challenge: State Attorney General
Enforcement of Section 411 Under State
Consumer Protection Law ............................................. 2380
A. Consumer Protection Law Generally ...................... 2382
B. Relationship to Violations of Federal Law in
Higher Education .................................................... 2383
C. The State Attorney General as an Enforcement
Mechanism............................................................... 2386
VI. Conclusion...................................................................... 2388
I. Introduction
While federal policymakers loudly combat the rapidly
surging cost of higher education in the United States, consider a
group of students who soundlessly remain outcasts: those who
cannot establish their residency status in the United States.
These students are ineligible recipients in the federal
government’s massive higher education funding push—the
federal student aid programs—and therefore remain bereft of a
resource relied upon by nearly half of the nation’s undergraduate
students.1 Undocumented students thus face a prohibitive
1.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5) (2012) (requiring a student be a U.S. citizen
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complication to their education: operatively, the limitation
concludes the education of many students once promisingly
educated in the nation’s public primary and secondary schools.2
In the past decade, states answered these concerns with
legislation allowing such students to receive in-state tuition rates
at public colleges and universities in the state regardless of
residency status.3 A majority of states, however, do not have such
laws, and the 2012 failure of the federal Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,4 which aimed to
alleviate the financial burden on undocumented students, levied
additional urgency to resolve this limitation. With a nod to this
pressure, public colleges and universities and state educational
boards enacted institutional policies to provide in-state tuition to
undocumented students without affirmative approval from the
state legislature.5
This Note examines federal impediments to institutional or
state policy delivered without affirmative state legislation. This
Note argues that Section 411 of the federal Personal
or national to receive any funding under the federal student aid programs). In
the most recent compilation of federal student aid data by the U.S. Department
of Education, 47% of undergraduate students relied on the federal student aid
programs to finance their education. Fast Facts: Financial Aid, NAT’L CENTER
FOR EDUC. STAT. AT THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2009), http://nces.ed.
gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=31 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, THE CASE FOR UNDOCUMENTED
STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2010), http://e4fc.org/images/E4FC_The
Case.pdf (noting that only 61% of undocumented students who arrive before age
fourteen go to college, compared to 76% of permanent legal residents and 71% of
residents born in the United States). Nearly 65,000 to 80,000 undocumented
students graduate from U.S. public high schools every year. Id. In Plyler v. Doe,
the Supreme Court prohibited states from refusing primary and secondary
public education to undocumented students. See 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
(prohibiting the state from charging tuition to those who cannot prove legal
residency).
3. See infra Part II.A (discussing current state law).
4. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th
Cong. (2012) (attempting to implement previous versions of the DREAM Act,
but failing in the Senate). The DREAM Act, in its various iterations, aimed to
grant temporary legal status to certain immigrant students and eliminate
penalties to allow states to determine residency for the purposes of in-state
tuition. See id. (containing the most recent DREAM Act provisions).
5. See infra Part II.B (examining institutional policies).

2342

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2339 (2013)

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA),6 in its own right, poses no bar to institutional policy
of this nature because it plainly does not encompass reduced
tuition in its prohibitions. In addition, this Note considers that
potential violations of Section 411 are not justiciable in a federal
suit from a private plaintiff because the provision carries no
private right of action, faces prohibitive sovereign immunity and
standing obstacles, and lacks momentum as a constitutional
issue. Finally, this Note argues that Section 411 is feasibly
justiciable in state court within, notably, a state consumer
protection lawsuit brought by a state attorney general.
Part II summarizes current state law, including states in
which there is affirmative legislation providing in-state tuition
rates to undocumented students and states in which there is
affirmative legislation denying in-state tuition rates for such
students.7 This Part looks closely at institutional policies in
states in which the legislature has not spoken on the issue—
particularly Rhode Island, Michigan, and Colorado8—and
explores how these policies operate and conform to existing law in
other states.9
Part III discusses federal statutory obstacles to institutional
policy issued without affirmative state legislation. In particular,
this Part studies Section 411 of PRWORA as the vital test to such
institutional policy while recognizing the bearing of Section 505
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)10 as a useful corollary to the institutional
policy discussion provoked by Section 411.11 This Part considers
6. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 § 411, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621
(2012)).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the existing state law).
8. In August 2013, the Colorado legislature did pass a law granting instate tuition to undocumented students. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the
Colorado law). The Colorado example, however, remains illustrative.
9. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the policies in Rhode Island, Colorado,
and Michigan).
10. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 505, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1623
(2012)).
11. See infra Part III.A–B (examining Section 505 and Section 411).
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that the incorporation of “postsecondary education” as a
prohibited state or local public benefit under Section 411 was not
meant to include reduced tuition, but instead was meant to
encompass only state grants and scholarships.12 Including
reduced tuition as a prohibited benefit is inconsistent with
existing case law examining Section 411, congressional intent in
enacting Section 411, and the Supreme Court’s assessment of
public education in Plyler v. Doe13 and Grutter v. Bollinger.14
Part IV observes that neither the federal government nor the
federal courts will police potential violations of Section 411
because there is no indication any federal agency has enforced
the provision in the sixteen years since its enactment, the
provision lacks a federal private right of action, and the provision
harbors sovereign immunity and standing limitations in federal
court. Further, this Part concludes that any constitutional claims
are substantively weak.15 Part V argues that, despite these
challenges in federal court, a state attorney general could force
consideration of the federal statute through a state claim under
state consumer protection law to protect the integrity of both
public universities and state citizens.16
II. In-State Tuition Law and Policy
A. Current State Law
Three states explicitly ban undocumented students from
receiving in-state tuition rates at public colleges and universities:
Arizona, Georgia, and Indiana.17 South Carolina prohibits
12. See infra Part III.B (discussing the interpretation of Section 411).
13. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
14. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing the justiciability limitations in federal
court).
16. See infra Part V (examining the possibility of a state law claim
exploring Section 411).
17. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1803(B) (2012) (“[A] person who was not
a citizen or legal resident of the United States or who is without legal
immigration status it not entitled to classification as an in-state student.”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-66(d) (2012) (“Noncitizen students shall not be classified as in-
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undocumented students from enrolling in public institutions at
all,18 and Alabama forbids undocumented students from enrolling
in state two-year institutions.19 Fifteen states employ laws
affirmatively granting eligibility for in-state tuition rates at
public colleges and universities: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and
Washington.20 Many of the remaining state legislatures have
considered bills modifying tuition-rate policy for undocumented
students,21 but legislation of this nature is politically charged and

state for tuition purposes unless the student is legally in this state and there is
evidence to warrant consideration of in-state classification as determined by the
board of regents.”); IND. CODE § 21-14-11-1(1) (2012) (“An individual who is not
lawfully present in the United States is not eligible to pay the resident tuition
rate that is determined by the state educational institution.”); see also Laura A.
Hernandez, Dreams Deferred—Why In-State College Tuition Rates Are Not a
Benefit Under the IIRIRA and How This Interpretation Violates the Spirit of
Plyler, 21 CORNELL J. L. PUB. & POL’Y 525, 556–60 (2012) (surveying state laws
denying in-state tuition benefits for undocumented students).
18. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2012) (“An alien unlawfully present
in the United States is not eligible to attend a public institution of higher
learning in this State.”).
19. See ALENE RUSSELL, AM. ASSOC. OF STATE COLLS. AND UNIVS., STATE
POLICIES REGARDING UNDOCUMENTED COLLEGE STUDENTS: A NARRATIVE OF
UNRESOLVED ISSUES, ONGOING DEBATE, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011),
http://www.aascu.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=4524 (describing the
Alabama prohibition on in-state tuition for the state’s public two-year colleges).
20. See Undocumented Students: State Action, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocument
ed-student-tuition-state-action.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing
states that currently have laws affirmatively granting in-state tuition to
undocumented students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In
Oklahoma, the legislature amended its law to allow the Oklahoma Board of
Regents to decide whether to grant in-state tuition to undocumented students;
currently, the Board still allows it. Id. In 2013, Colorado, Minnesota, and
Oregon joined the ranks of states with legislation affirmatively granting in-state
tuition to undocumented students. Id.
21. See RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that, as of 2011, 32 states have
considered or passed in-state tuition legislation). The number of state
legislatures grappling with this issue unceasingly seesaws. In 2013, 23 state
legislatures considered bills to improve access to higher education for
undocumented students, including legislatures that previously struck down
such legislation. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., STATE BILLS ON ACCESS TO
EDUCATION FOR IMMIGRANTS 2013 1, 1–6 (2013).
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therefore notably difficult to enact, often languishing in the
hands of lawmakers.22
Laws providing in-state tuition rates for undocumented
students are also controversially received—public disagreement
is nearly guaranteed, and legal challenge often awaits. For
example, Maryland lawmakers passed a bill in 2011 allowing
undocumented students to receive in-state tuition rates.23
Governor Martin O’Malley’s ratifying signature incited a public
petition condemning the law and sending it to a voter’s
referendum for its reckoning; the law survived the popular vote
in November 2012, after over a year of controversy.24 Similarly,
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker revoked Wisconsin’s 2009
legislative tuition break in his 2011 budget after significant
public disagreement over the law’s enactment.25 In 2002, the
Virginia attorney general issued an opinion forbidding public
colleges and universities from enrolling undocumented students
22. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Illegal Immigrant Tuition Break Fails Again in
Colorado House, DENVER POST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.denver
post.com/breakingnews/ci_20481859/illegal-immigrant-tuition-break-fails-againcolorado-house (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the repeated failure of the
Colorado tuition bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Colorado General Assembly made six attempts at a legislative in-state tuition
break before passing the 2013 bill. Id; see also RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 4
(describing legislative attempts to pass laws granting in-state tuition); NAT’L
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 21, at 1–8 (detailing the progress of 2013
legislation aimed at tuition laws for undocumented students).
23. S.B. 167, 431st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0167e.pdf; see also Ann E.
Marimow, Gov. Martin O’Malley Signs Immigrant Tuition Bill Into Law in
Maryland, WASH. POST (May 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/politics/gov-martin-omalley-signs-immigrant-tuition-bill-into-law-inmaryland/2011/05/10/AFNNz8jG_story.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(describing the enactment of Maryland S.B. 167) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
24. See Unofficial 2012 Presidential General Election Results for All State
Questions, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56:01 PM),
http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_2012_4_00
_1.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (reporting the tuition measure as passed) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 20 (noting the
Wisconsin revocation); see also STATE OF WIS. 2011–13 EXEC. BUDGET 12 (2011),
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/bib1113.pdf (describing Governor Scott
Walker’s budget plan revoking the in-state tuition availability).
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or granting in-state tuition to undocumented students.26 Thus,
laws providing a reduced tuition rate to undocumented students
are difficult to enact and difficult to sustain because of the
divided political climate and public opposition they foster.
Because of these barriers, a majority of states remain without
legislation, and hundreds of universities remain without
legislative guidance.
B. Shifting Toward Institutional Policy
The difficulty of formal legislative enactment affords an
opening to accommodate undocumented students living in the
state. In systems where a nonlegislative body has the power to
make tuition classifications, that body can adjust the tuition rate
for this category of students. Similar tuition classifications exist
throughout public higher education. The most straightforward
and common division is between in-state and out-of-state legal
residents27—the legality of that classification is generally
undisputed, and the Supreme Court legitimated the state’s
interest in providing a reduced tuition rate to its bona fide
26. See Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Commonwealth of Va. Office of the Att’y Gen. on Immigration Law Compliance
Update (Sept. 5, 2002), http://www.schev.edu/adminfaculty/immigrationmemo95-02apl.pdf (stating the Virginia attorney general’s opinion that Virginia public
colleges and universities should not enroll undocumented students). The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia invalidated the state attorney
general’s position in 2004. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d
585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding the attorney general’s position that
undocumented students may not be enrolled based on federal law invalid). After
the state’s attorney general said enrollment alone violated IIRIRA and
PRWORA, the court concluded that enrollment alone is not within the definition
of “benefit” under either statute. Id.
27. See, e.g., Fees, Tuition, and Estimated Budget 2013-2014, UNIV. OF CAL.
AT L.A. UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS (last updated May 15, 2013),
http://www.admissions.ucla.edu/prospect/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(listing the different tuition rates for in-state residents and nonresidents) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Tuition, Fees, & Estimated Cost
of Attendance, UNIV. OF VA. OFF. OF UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSION (last updated
Oct. 12, 2013, 6:22 AM), http://www.admission.virginia.edu/admission/tuition
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (detailing the different cost of attendance for
residents of Virginia and nonresidents) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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residents.28 Universities, however, often make less publicized
tuition classifications as well. For example, tuition reciprocity
agreements allow some out-of-state residents to receive a reduced
rate at public universities in neighboring states; this rate is
generally available only to an out-of-state student whose home
state is a party to the reciprocity agreement, foreclosing the
reduced rate to other out-of-state students.29 These arrangements
allow out-of-state residents to pay reduced rates at public
institutions in neighboring states that are parties to the
agreement; often, the reduced rate is 150% of the in-state rate.30
In some states, this arrangement consists of a simple agreement
with a neighbor state that allows students in each state to pay in28. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325–33 (1983) (“A bona fide
residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers
the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents
are enjoyed only by residents.”). In Martinez, the Court clarified that the
meaning of residence can vary, but a policy may certainly consider both
“physical presence and intention to remain” without violating the Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 327–30 (finding tuition policy favoring residents
constitutional).
29. See, e.g., Western Undergraduate Exchange, W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR
HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/wue (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(explaining the tuition reciprocity system) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). There are four major tuition-reciprocity systems in the United
States: the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, Western
Undergraduate Exchange (WICHE–WUE), the Southern Regional Education
Board Academic Common Market (SREB), the New England Board of Higher
Education Tuition Break program (NEBHE), and the Midwestern Higher
Education Compact (MHEC). Id.; Academic Common Market, S. REGIONAL
EDUC. BOARD, http://www.sreb.org/page/1304/academic_common_market.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (explaining the SREB system) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Regional Student Program Tuition Break,
NEW ENG. BOARD OF HIGHER EDUC., http://www.nebhe.org/programsoverview/rsp-tuition-break/overview/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the
NEBHE tuition break program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Midwest Student Exchange Program, MIDWESTERN HIGHER EDUC.
COMPACT, http://msep.mhec.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the
MHEC tuition break program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
30. See, e.g., Western Undergraduate Exchange, W. INTERSTATE COMMISSION
FOR HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/wue (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(“Students who are residents of WICHE states are eligible to request a reduced
tuition rate of 150% of resident tuition at participating two- and four-year
college programs outside of their home state.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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state tuition rates at public universities of the other state.31
Similarly, many public universities charge a different rate for
different programs of study at the university.32 The law abides
these classifications and universities regularly utilize them.
Given these accepted categories, the existence of a tuition
classification alone is not enough to render a tuition classification
for undocumented students unlawful. Accordingly, institutions
have begun offering reduced tuition rates for undocumented
students.33 Institutional policy tends to mirror the terms
stipulated in existing state laws, which are reasonably consistent:
the student must (1) have attended a state high school for three
years or graduated from a state high school;34 (2) be registered
with or currently enrolled in a state college or university; and
31. See, e.g., Tuition Reciprocity, MINN. OFF. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
http://www.ohe.state.mn.us/mPg.cfm?pageID=813&1534D83A_1933715A=1d7188c51 3e76f1f094bf8d1b85694f136c2f9e1 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2013) (explaining that Minnesota has reciprocity agreements with
Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, one institution in Iowa, and the
Canadian province of Manitoba) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
32. See, e.g., Tuition Costs, Fall/Spring 2013–2014, UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/tuition/costs.html (last visited Nov. 10,, 2013)
(showing different tuition rates depending on undergraduate program of study)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); CU-Boulder Full-Time
Tuition and Fees by School/College and Year, UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER OFF.
PLAN., BUDGET, & ANALYSIS (last updated Aug. 26, 2012),
OF
http://www.colorado.edu/pba/budget/tuitionfees/tuitfee.HTML (last visited Nov.
10, 2013) (listing variable tuition rates by program of study and residency) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See, e.g., Understanding Metropolitan State University of Denver’s
Colorado High School/GED Non-resident Tuition Rate, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
METRO. STATE UNIV. OF DENVER, http://www.msudenver.edu/president/chsged/
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum]
(explaining the university’s new in-state tuition policy for undocumented
students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); S.B. 12-015, 68th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012), http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/
CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/3DA9CD12AA62452F87257981007E06CA?Open
&file=015_01.pdf (including the language of the failed ASSET bill).
34. In some variations, the law requires that the student also lived in the
state with a parent or guardian while attending that high school. See, e.g., TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052(a)(3), 54.053(3) (2012) (classifying as a resident a
person who graduated from a public or private high school in Texas or received
the equivalent of a high school diploma, and maintained a residence
continuously in Texas for three years preceding the date of graduation).
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(3) sign an affidavit certifying he is currently seeking legal
residency status or will do so as soon as he is eligible.35 These
laws have withstood some legal challenge in state courts,36 and,
though questioned and controversial, their terms have proceeded
legally unscathed for the last decade. In this framework, three
notable efforts to reduce tuition for undocumented students in the
absence of state legislation affirmatively reducing that tuition
merit further mention.37
35. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2001) (listing the
requirements for in-state tuition for a student who cannot prove legal residency
in California); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6301(5) (2002) (defining “resident” for tuition
classification purposes). A student qualifies for in-state tuition under California
law if he or she (1) attended a California high school for three or more years;
(2) graduated from a California high school or received the equivalent GED;
(3) is registered or currently enrolled in a California community college, a
California state university, or a University of California institution; and
(4) signed a statement with the college or university stating he or she will apply
for legal residency as soon as he is eligible. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5. In New
York, the resident definition includes a student who (1) attended a New York
high school for two or more years, graduated, and applied to attend a City
University of New York (CUNY) institution within five years or (2) attended a
New York state program for the GED exam preparation and applied to attend a
CUNY institution within five years; and (3) filed an affidavit stating the student
has applied or will apply for legal residence. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6301(5). See also
ALEJANDRA RINCON, THE COLLEGE BD., REPOSITORY OF RESOURCES FOR
UNDOCUMENTED
STUDENTS
2–39
(2012),
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/Repository-ResourcesUndocumented-Students_2012.pdf (summarizing legal requirements in each
state granting in-state tuition to undocumented students).
36. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 864
(Cal. 2010) (upholding California’s in-state tuition for undocumented students
law).
37. Arizona and Massachusetts are also struggling with this controversy;
however, both tie reduced-tuition eligibility to eligibility under the federal
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) law, which defers deportation
enforcement for individuals who meet certain criteria, and allows them to
receive work permits. In November 2012, Massachusetts Governor Deval
Patrick directed the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education to offer the
in-state rate to undocumented students eligible for work permits in
Massachusetts. See Kevin Robillard, Report: Mass. to Offer In-State Tuition to
Illegal Immigrants, POLITICO (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 12:10 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84040.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2013) (announcing the Massachusetts policy) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Because these laws implicate federal law for the eligibility
determination and therefore raise different legal questions, this Note will focus
on examples that do not employ that implication.
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1. Rhode Island Board of Governors

The Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education
(the Board) is the regulatory agency responsible for running the
three public institutions in Rhode Island: the Community College
of Rhode Island, Rhode Island College, and the University of
Rhode Island.38 The Rhode Island General Assembly failed to
pass its 2010 bill proposing to exempt undocumented students
from paying nonresident tuition.39 In its wake, the Board voted to
adopt an amendment to its residency policy, which sets tuition
rates at the public institutions in Rhode Island. The amendment
allows certain undocumented students to receive the in-state
tuition rate at its public universities, effective Fall 2012.40 The
policy amendment defines “resident” to require that:
The student has attended an approved Rhode Island high
school for three (3) or more years and continues to live in
Rhode Island; and [t]he student has graduated from an
approved Rhode Island high school or received a high school
equivalency diploma from the state of Rhode Island; and [i]f
the student is not a U.S. citizen and/or does not have lawful
immigration status, he or she has filed an affidavit with the
institution stating that the student has filed an application for
lawful immigration status, or will file such an application as
soon as he or she is eligible to do so. The failure of a student to
file an application for lawful immigration status as soon as he
or she is eligible will result in a forfeiture of in-state tuition
rates in the future.41

The requirements mirror both the language of state law in other
states and the failed Rhode Island bill.42 Despite public criticism,
38. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-59-4 (2006) (describing the responsibilities of
the Board).
39. H.B. 7172, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2010).
40. See R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER EDUC., MEETING MINUTES OF
SEPT. 26, 2011, at 5–7 (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.ribghe.org/pdfs/2b050712.pdf
(voting to adopt the new residency policy granting in-state tuition to
undocumented students in Rhode Island); R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER
EDUC., RESIDENCY POLICY (EFFECTIVE FALL 2012) 1–2 [hereinafter R.I. RESIDENCY
POLICY], http://www.ribghe.org/residency1for2012.pdf (allowing an undocumented
student to receive in-state tuition and fees upon satisfying certain requirements).
41. R.I. RESIDENCY POLICY, supra note 40, at 1–2.
42. See H.B. 7172, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2010) (listing the
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there has been no legal challenge to the Rhode Island policy to
date, and the policy is currently in effect.43
2. Michigan: The University of Michigan
In 2013, the University of Michigan became the most recent
institution to offer in-state tuition to undocumented students without
the affirmative signature of the state legislature. Like Rhode Island,
the Board of Regents for the University of Michigan passed a
measure allowing in-state tuition for undocumented students who
(1) attended high school in Michigan for at least 3 years, (2) attended
middle school in Michigan for 2 years prior to high school, and
(3) matriculated at the University of Michigan within 28 months of
graduating from a Michigan high school.44 Michigan has no state law
affirmatively providing these benefits, and the measure only affects
tuition at the University of Michigan; other state schools still charge
the out-of-state rate to undocumented students.45
3. Colorado: Metropolitan State University of Denver
Prior to the 2013 Colorado legislation affirmatively providing instate tuition to undocumented students, Metropolitan State
University of Denver (MSU) implemented an institutional
policy roviding in-state tuition. Its policy, however, remains
proposed requirements for an undocumented student seeking in-state tuition);
supra Part II.A (describing the requirements from existing state law).
43. See Tina Susman, Rhode Island Gives In-State Tuition to Illegal
Immigrant Students, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at 9, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/09/rhode-island-approves-in-statetuition-for-children-of-.html (explaining public controversy over the Rhode Island
policy).
44. UNIV. OF MICH. REGENTS, GUIDELINES FOR IN-STATE TUITION 7 (2013),
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/pa/key/documents/INSTATETUITIONGUIDELINE
S.pdf.
45. See Aaron Guggenheim, Regents Pass Measure to Provide In-State
Tuition for Undocumented Immigrants and Veterans, MICH. DAILY (July 18,
2013), http://www.michigandaily.com/news/regents-pass-measures-provide-state
-tuition-undocumented-immigrants-and-veterans (last visited Dec. 11, 2013)
(discussing the recently enacted University of Michigan policy) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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illustrative of a controversial institutional policy that explicitly
eliminates direct state subsidies that would typically be included
in an in-state tuition rate. MSU is a public university in Colorado
serving nearly 23,000 students.46 When the Colorado legislature
failed to pass its in-state tuition for undocumented students bill47
for the sixth time, the MSU Board of Trustees voted to adopt an
institutional policy providing a discounted tuition rate to
students who live in Colorado but cannot prove lawful presence,
effective August 2012.48 Without this policy, such students would
be permitted to enroll, but would be treated as out-of-state
residents paying the full out-of-state tuition rate. The policy,
however, allows the students to pay less than the full out-of-state
tuition rate, though they still pay more than a resident of
Colorado who is classified as in-state based on proof of lawful
presence.49 In other words, undocumented students are not
paying the same rate as either an in-state resident or an out-ofstate resident—they fall within a separate classification
altogether. A legal Colorado resident attending MSU pays $4,304
per academic year (two semesters); an out-of-state student
attending MSU pays $15,985.20 per academic year.50 An
undocumented student taking advantage of the nonresident
tuition policy pays $7,157.04 per academic year.51
The variation in the rates results from overt exclusion of all
direct per-student state stipends from the rate for undocumented
students.52 The state typically subsidizes part of the in-state rate
46. See About MSU Denver, METRO. ST. UNIV. OF DENVER,
http://www.msudenver.edu/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the
structure of Metropolitan State University Denver) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
47. See S.B. 12-015, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012),
http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/3DA9CD12AA62
452F87257981007E06CA?Open&file=015_01.pdf (outlining Colorado’s most
recent failed tuition bill, ASSET).
48. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (allowing
students who cannot prove legal residence in Colorado but attended high school
in the state to receive in-state tuition).
49. See id. (explaining the tuition classifications at MSU).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Memorandum from Stephen M. Jordan, President, Metro. State
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through these stipends, resulting in a charge reduction to bona
fide residents. Thus, MSU’s undocumented student-rate
calculation begins with the $4,304 charged to in-state residents,
then adds back and charges the student the exact amount of state
stipends, including $1,860, $342.04, and $650.60, totaling
$7,157.04.53
Like the Rhode Island policy, MSU’s requirements for
undocumented students seeking to utilize this residency
classification follow the pattern set by existing state law and the
failed Colorado bill. The student must have (1) attended a
Colorado high school for at least three years; (2) graduated from a
Colorado high school or completed a GED in Colorado; and
(3) submitted an affidavit that certifies he is in good legal
standing and is seeking or intends to seek lawful status when he
is eligible.54

Univ. of Denver, to Members of the Joint Budget Comm. (June 19, 2012),
http://www.msudenver.edu/media/content/presidentofficeof/6-20-12%20JBC%20
Memo.pdf [hereinafter Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum] (describing MSU’s
deliberate exclusion of state stipends from the calculation). Colorado public
universities are unique in receiving three direct per-student stipends from the
state for each resident to whom they grant in-state tuition—the College
Opportunity Fund (COF), the Fee-for-Service (FFS) subsidy, and the capital
contribution allocation. See Memorandum from Dianne E. Ray, CPA, State
Auditor, to Members of the Legislative Audit Comm. 4 (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.leg.state.co.us/OSA/coauditor1.nsf/All/A0A7A668C004B5118725793A0
079854C/$FILE/HE%20ENTERPRISE%20MEMO%20-%20102111.pdf (describing
the state stipends in Colorado). COF is a state-funded voucher for in-state
students attending state universities of which students must authorize
disbursement on their behalf, currently at a rate of $62.00 per credit hour. See
College Opportunity Fund (COF) Stipend, COLO. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC.,
http://highered.colorado.gov/Finance/COF/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(describing the COF system in Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The purpose of this voucher system is to eliminate a tuition cap
imposed by the Colorado Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) by allowing a public
university to be classified as an enterprise and thus gain exemption from
TABOR. See Ray, supra, at 6 (describing the benefits of enterprise status).
Finally, the school also receives the FFS and capital contribution in the amounts
of $342.04, and $650.60, respectively. Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum,
supra, at 4.
53. See Joint Budget Comm. Memorandum, supra note 52, at 4 (detailing
the deliberate exclusion of state stipends from the nonresident rate calculation).
54. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (describing
the requirements imposed under MSU’s nonresident policy).
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At the request of the Colorado Community Colleges, Colorado
Attorney General John W. Suthers reviewed MSU’s policy. In
June 2012, that office issued an opinion stating MSU’s policy
violates federal law and risks federal funds to the state.55 The
opinion reasoned that discounted tuition is a “public benefit”
within the meaning of Section 411 of PRWORA, and that MSU
therefore may not provide it without legislative approval.56 The
institution moved forward with the policy despite the negative
opinion and enrolled students under the new rate beginning in
August 2012.57
III. Federal Statutory Obstacles to Institutional Policy
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration
issues, institutional policies affecting undocumented students
implicate federal law.58 Two federal statutes bear on this issue:
Section 505 of IIRIRA,59 and Section 411 of PRWORA.60 While
Section 505 is peripherally implicated, institutional policies raise
particular concerns under Section 411.61

55. See Op. Colo. Att’y Gen. No. 12-04 AG Alpha No. HE CO AGBDU (June
19, 2012) (finding the university’s policy in violation of Section 411 of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act).
56. See id. (discussing reduced tuition as a public benefit); see also infra
Part III.B.1 (discussing the interpretation of “state or local public benefit” under
Section 411).
57. See Anthony Cotton, Metro State Tuition Plan Gives Some Hope, Leaves
Others Fuming, DENVER POST (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.denverpost.
com/news/ci_21387731/metro-state-tuition-rate-plan-gives-some-hope (last visited
Sept. 1, 2013) (describing reactions to Metro State University’s new tuition plan
for undocumented students) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”), superseded by
statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)).
59. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 505, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1623).
60. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 § 411, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621).
61. See infra Part III.B (describing the challenges to institutional policy
raised by PRWORA).

THE PROMISE OF PLYLER

2355

A. IIRIRA Section 505
Section 505 of IIRIRA provides that an alien not lawfully
present in the United States shall not:
[B]e eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a
political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit
unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for
such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope)
without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a
resident.62

This provision presents two challenges to law or policy granting
in-state tuition to an undocumented student.
First, Section 505 raises the possibility of a federal
preemption challenge to any state law or policy granting a tuition
rate to an undocumented student on the basis of residency.63 In
2010, however, the California Supreme Court ruled that
attendance at a high school in the state is “not the functional
equivalent of residency,”64 and therefore dismissed the
preemption challenge because the law simply did not award a
benefit on the basis of residency.65 No other legal challenge under
Section 505 gained momentum on the merits, and states still
generally follow the California model.66 In fact, the Colorado
attorney general explicitly declined to consider Section 505 when
evaluating MSU’s tuition policy, noting that the California
Supreme Court upheld the approach.67 Thus, awarding in-state
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a).
63. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 864
(Cal. 2010) (challenging state law granting in-state tuition as preempted by
Section 505).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 861 (noting the statute’s “criteria are not the same as
residence, nor are they a de facto or surrogate residency requirement”).
66. See supra Part II.B (describing the structure of in-state tuition laws).
Other claims for violations of Section 505 have been dismissed for lack of
standing. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing on justiciability grounds).
67. See Op. Colo. Att’y Gen. No. 12-04 AG Alpha No. HE CO AGBDU (June
19, 2012) (“Metro State’s proposal . . . seeks to avoid IIRIRA’s specific
prohibition by administering the tuition discount [based] . . . upon three years’
attendance and graduation from high school here. This approach was upheld in
California, and it is not necessary to question it in this Opinion.”(footnotes
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tuition on the basis of attending high school in the state
continues to proceed unharmed, though no federal court has
spoken on the issue.
Second, Section 505 raises questions about the interpretation
of the term “postsecondary education benefit.” The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), responsible for administering Section
505,68 clarified that enrollment in a public institution of higher
education alone is not a benefit encompassed by Section 505.69 As
such, enrolling undocumented students does not violate these
provisions, but DHS has issued no further clarifications. The
legislative history surrounding Section 505 is similarly
inconclusive. A conference report for an unenacted predecessor
bill to Section 505 indicates that “postsecondary education
benefit,” as defined in that bill, was meant to include in-state
tuition.70 Martinez v. Regents of the University of California71
concluded, however, that while the committee report for this
unenacted bill could reasonably apply to Section 505 because it
included the same language, it did not reliably show Congress
omitted)).
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (conferring enforcement of “this chapter
and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens” on
the Secretary of Homeland Security).
69. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to Jim Hackenberg, Raleigh News and Observer (May 9,
2008) (explaining that it is the school’s decision whether to enroll undocumented
students); Letter from Sheriff Jim Pendergraph, Exec. Dir., Office of State and
Local Coordination, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas J. Ziko, Special
Deputy Att’y Gen., N.C. Dep’t of Justice (July 9, 2008) (stating DHS’s position
that admission to a public university is not one of the benefits regulated by
Section 505 and Section 411). This position is consistent with case law finding
enrollment alone is not a benefit as defined in IIRIRA or PRWORA. See Equal
Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Simply put,
access to public higher education is not a benefit governed by PRWORA.”).
70. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 240 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This section
provides that illegal aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public
institutions of higher education.”). IIRIRA was proposed as its own bill (H.R.
2202 in the 104th Congress), but ultimately implemented as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009. The conference report accompanying the enacted bill does not
elaborate on the meaning of this provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-863 (1997)
(Conf. Rep.).
71. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
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intended to prohibit states from allowing unlawful aliens to pay
nonresident tuition.72 The report, the court reasoned, imposed a
strict prohibition and therefore simplified actual statutory
language that was “not absolute, but qualified,”73 and therefore
the statutory language itself prevailed.74 Thus, enrollment alone
is not a benefit under Section 505, but law and policy sidestep the
remaining interpretive issues surrounding “postsecondary
education benefit” altogether by tying in-state tuition rates to
attendance at a high school in the state rather than residency in
that state. Handled as such, the reduced rate is no longer a
residency-based benefit, thereby removing it from the scope of
Section 505 without regard for the reach of “postsecondary
education benefit.”
B. PRWORA Section 411
Section 411 of PRWORA provides that an alien who does not
fall within any exception “is not eligible for any state or local
public benefit.”75 The thrust of this provision is to exclude any
undocumented individual from receiving any assistance that falls
within the meaning of “state or local public benefit.”76 Section
72. Id. at 865.
73. Id.
74. See id. (“Some legislators might have supported section 1623’s plain
language qualifying the prohibition but not have supported the committee
report’s seemingly absolute language. Section 1623’s actual language prevails,
not the committee report’s.”).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012). Classes of individuals excepted from these
provisions are (1) qualified aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1641, which includes lawfully
present aliens; (2) nonimmigrant aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which includes
ambassadors and diplomats; and (3) aliens paroled into the United States under
8 U.S.C. § 1182.
76. In another provision employing language similar to Section 411,
PRWORA also precludes such an alien from receiving federal public benefits.
See id. § 1611 (“[A]n alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any
Federal public benefit.”). Tuition rates are classified by the state, so the federal
public benefit definition is not directly applicable. See id. § 1611(c) (“Federal
public benefit means . . . any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided . . . by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the
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411(c) defines “state or local public benefit” to include “any grant,
contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license
provided by an agency of a State or local government or by
appropriated funds of a State or local government,”77 and “any
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment
benefit,”78 or “any other similar benefit for which payments or
assistance are provided . . . by an agency of a State or local
government or by appropriated funds of a State or local
government.”79
Section 411 also permits the state to affirmatively legislate to
allow eligibility for the otherwise prohibited benefits listed in the
section.80 Because of this exception, the remaining provisions of
Section 411 do not bind any state that passes a law permitting an
undocumented student to receive in-state tuition. Thus, the “state
or local public benefit” definition is not implicated in discussions
of the fifteen states that have laws affirmatively permitting instate tuition to undocumented students.81
The definition is relevant, however, to institutional policies
in states in which there is no affirmative legislation. In other
words, if a reduced tuition rate is considered a “public benefit”
within this definition, an institution enacting its own policy
granting such a rate to an undocumented student would be in
violation of federal law. If a reduced tuition rate is outside the
definition of “public benefit,” an institution could offer that rate
on its own and maintain compliance with Section 411.

United States.”).
77. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(A).
78. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(B).
79. Id. PRWORA excepts from this definition assistance for health care
items needed for emergency medical treatment; short-term emergency disaster
relief; public health assistance for immunizations and related testing for
symptoms of communicable diseases; and certain programs specified by the
Attorney General that deliver in-kind services, do not condition the provision of
assistance or the amount of assistance or the cost of assistance on the
individual’s income or resources, and are necessary for the protection of life or
safety. Id. § 1621(b).
80. Id. § 1621(d).
81. See supra Part II.A (exploring current state law).
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1. The Text of Section 411 Indicates Reduced Tuition Is Not a
“State or Local Public Benefit”
Though Section 411 includes the term “postsecondary
education” in its list of forbidden benefits,82 the scope of the term
is unclear.83 Contextually, the term harbors two possible
interpretations: first, it could be understood broadly to include
any and all possible assistance flowing from a postsecondary
education institution, or, second, it could be understood to include
only certain categories of assistance. For instance, a
postsecondary education benefit could include enrollment in a
public institution, reduced tuition at a public institution, state
grant aid toward a public institution, or any combination of these.
Both courts and the executive branch, however, carved out
enrollment in a public institution from the meaning of
“postsecondary education benefit” by excluding it under Section
505 and Section 411,84 suggesting that courts and the executive
branch consider various aspects of postsecondary education to be
severable, distinct units, some of which may fall within the
statutory definition and some of which may not. As such,
postsecondary education benefits under Section 411 could
reasonably apply only to a subset of—and not to all—
postsecondary education-related remunerations.

82. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B) (2012).
83. Very little case law exists on this provision. See infra Part III.B.2
(discussing the case law examining Section 411).
84. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 605 (E.D. Va.
2004) (“Simply put, access to public higher education is not a benefit governed
by PRWORA.”); McPherson v. McCabe, No. 5:04-CT-990-FL, 2007 WL 4246582,
at *4 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 10, 2007) (finding decisions on enrolling undocumented
students in higher education within the school’s discretion because it is not a
benefit within the federal statute and therefore not preempted by federal law);
Sanchez v. Hall, No. 5:10-CT-3027-D, 2011 WL 6369821, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec.
19, 2011) (following McPherson and allowing the institution to decide whether to
enroll undocumented students); U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 69 (explaining it is the
school’s decision whether to enroll undocumented students); Pendergraph, supra
note 69 (explaining admission to a public university is not a benefit
encompassed by IIRIRA); see also supra Part III.A (discussing interpretation of
Section 505).
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Section 411 specifies that any benefit similar to those
listed—including retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, and
unemployment benefits85—would also be prohibited under this
provision. Critically, however, receiving the full benefit of reduced
tuition differs from the other listed items in that it requires a
significant financial contribution from the recipient to fulfill it.
For example, at MSU in Colorado, an undocumented student
receiving this “benefit” would still pay nearly $29,000 out-ofpocket for a four-year degree and receive no direct monetary
contribution from the state.86 An individual recipient of
retirement, welfare, health, disability, or public or assisted
housing may pay no out-of-pocket monetary amount at all in the
same period, but that individual may receive significant and
direct monetary contributions from the state.
This distinction suggests reduced tuition is a different type of
benefit; in fact, the postsecondary education benefit most similar
to the listed benefits is state grant aid.87 In the academic year
prior to the enactment of Section 411, states awarded $2.9 billion
in grant aid from state funds to postsecondary education
students.88 This number excludes loan amounts that must be
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B) (2012).
86. See MSU Nonresident Rate Memorandum, supra note 33 (detailing
that the rate for the special category of nonresidents is $7,157.04 per academic
year); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing MSU’s policy).
87. For an example of an available state grant program, see Helping
Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Program, GA. STUDENT FIN.
COMMISSION,
http://www.gsfc.org/gsfcnew/HopeProgramm.CFM?sec=3
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the financial assistance available under the
HOPE scholarship program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE STUDENT GRANT & AID PROGRAMS (NASSGAP),
TABLE 1: TOTAL GRANT AID AWARDED BY STATE GRANT PROGRAMS, 1995–96,
27TH ANNUAL SURVEY ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID, available
at http://www.nassgap.org/viewrepository.aspx?categoryID=3. This figure
includes both need-based and merit-based aid. Id. The amount of state grant
aid disbursed has steadily increased over the past forty years, in part due to
the introduction of the federal Leveraging Educational Assistance
Partnership (LEAP) program, which appropriates federal funds to assist
states in providing grant aid. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070c(a) (2012) (describing the
incentives authorized by LEAP); John J. Cheslock & Rodney P. Hughes,
Differences Across States in Higher Education Finance Policy 4–5 (Ctr. for the
Study of Higher Educ., Pa. State Univ., Working Paper No. 5, 2011),
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repaid to the state; it is exclusively grant aid for which the
student must repay nothing. For the 2010–2011 academic year,
this figure was $9.2 billion.89 State grant aid, then, is a
significant
state expenditure requiring no
monetary
contribution from the student; this differs greatly from reduced
tuition, for which the state provides no direct monetary
contribution and the significant expenditure comes from the
student.
These state grant funds come directly from state coffers. In
Georgia, for example, the Helping Outstanding Pupils
Educationally (HOPE) grant program is funded entirely by
revenue from the Georgia lottery.90 In contrast, any expenditure
toward reduced tuition is indirect, coming from a blend of
private and state funds that run the institution.91 For instance,
in 2011, four-year public institutions of higher education saw, on
average, over 40% of their educational operating revenue come
from privately paid tuition, with the remainder derived from
state support and other sources.92 Reduced tuition, then, is not
directly paid by the state as state grants are; rather, loss
resulting from reduced tuition is an amalgam of private funding
and indirect state support that is not clearly allocable to state
funds because operation of the institution is not fully statesupported.
In other words, the difference between state grant aid and
reduced tuition is dollar-for-dollar actual loss. Though an
undocumented student pays less at an in-state rate than he
would pay at an out-of-state rate, analogy of the amount lost by
available
at
http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/cshe/working-papers/WP%235
(describing increases in state grant aid over the past few decades).
89. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE STUDENT GRANT & AID PROGRAMS, TABLE 1: TOTAL
GRANT AID AWARDED BY STATE GRANT PROGRAMS, 2010–11, 42ND ANNUAL SURVEY
ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.
nassgap.org/viewrepository.aspx?categoryID=3.
90. See GA. STUDENT FIN. COMMISSION, supra note 87 (describing the HOPE
scholarship program as fully funded by revenue from the Georgia state lottery).
91. See STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS (SHEEO), STATE HIGHER
EDUCATION FINANCE, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 22 (2012), http://www.sheeo.
org/sites/default/files/publications/SHEF_FY11.pdf (examining the sources of
revenue at public institutions of higher education).
92. Id. at 21.

2362

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2339 (2013)

reducing tuition to the amount lost by paying a state grant
award leans on the assumption that an undocumented student
would still attend that school if required to pay out-of-state
tuition, and that assumption is doubtful.93
Once paid, then, the cost deducted from state funds for a
state grant is fixed, but the price tag on reduced tuition is less
clear. The state would not necessarily lose the difference between
out-of-state tuition and reduced tuition because there is no
guarantee that the student would attend the state university if
charged the full out-of-state rate, and there is no guarantee the
money toward the reduction came from state funds. Congress’s
purpose in including “postsecondary education” as a prohibited
benefit under Section 411, then, could reasonably be to protect
the sizeable, certain expenditure of state grants and scholarships,
and not reduced tuition.
2. Case Law Evaluating Section 411 Supports This Interpretation
Very few courts have studied the meaning of Section 411.
Martinez v. Regents of the University of California94 raised
questions about the specific interpretation of “state or local public
benefit” as it relates to in-state tuition classifications within
Section 411, but the court did not decide the issue because the
California law at issue fell within the Section 411 exception
allowing the state to affirmatively legislate to provide any
benefit.95 Again, courts agree that enrollment alone is not a
benefit encompassed by Section 411.96 The few other courts to
93. See LATINO POLICY INST., THE EFFECTS OF IN-STATE TUITION FOR NONCITIZENS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 10 (2011),
http://rwu.edu/sites/default/files/lpi-report.pdf (noting that there is a 31%
increase in noncitizen enrollment in states where in-state tuition is offered to
undocumented students). In addition, noncitizens are statutorily ineligible for
all federal student aid programs administered by the U.S. Department of
Education, limiting the most popular and accessible avenues to fund higher
education. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5) (2012) (requiring a student be a U.S. citizen or
national to receive any funding under the Title IV programs).
94. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
95. See id. at 867–68 (concluding that the state had legislated to
affirmatively provide the benefit, thus bringing the case within Section 411(d)).
96. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing enrollment falling
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interpret Section 411 recognize a difference between direct, needbased state expenditures and assistance to which the individual
is contributing, though these cases deal with specific issues in
individual states that do not directly answer the in-state tuition
question.97 In Department of Health v. Rodriguez ex rel.
Melendez,98 the Florida District Court of Appeals found the Brain
and Spinal Cord Injury program, which is wholly funded by the
state,99 to be within the definition of “state or local public benefit”
and, therefore, unavailable to illegal immigrants without
affirmative state legislation.100 Similarly, a New York state court
found funds from the state food stamp program unquestionably a
public benefit under Section 411.101

outside the public benefit definition).
97. Most courts to consider questions surrounding Section 411 do not
decide the meaning of “state or local public benefit.” See, e.g., Martinez, 241 P.3d
at 867–68 (concluding that the state had legislated to affirmatively provide the
benefit, thus bringing the case within the exception in Section 411(d) and
rendering the other provisions of Section 411 irrelevant); Pimentel v. Dreyfus,
670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying the plaintiff’s request for a
preliminary injunction because the plaintiff either lacked standing or would not
succeed on the merits, rather than deciding the interpretation of Section 411);
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675 F.3d 802, 816
(5th Cir. 2012) (deciding the ordinance in question aimed only at targeting the
presence of illegal aliens and therefore infringed on the federal authority over
immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs, rather than deciding the
statutory interpretation question); Garcia v. Dicterow, No. G039824, 2008 WL
5050358, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2008) (dismissing the § 1621 complaint on
agency grounds without deciding whether the benefit in question fell within the
statutory definition).
98. 5 So.3d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
99. See Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program, FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://www.floridahealth.gov/diseases-and-conditions/brain-and-spinal-cordinjuries/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the Brain and Spinal
Cord Injury Program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
program is funded through traffic-related fines, surcharges for driving or
boating under the influence, fees on temporary license tags, and a percentage of
fees from the motorcycle specialty tag. Id.
100. See Rodriguez, 5 So.3d at 25 (finding BSCI funding within the
definition of state or local public benefit, and not within any of the statutory
exemptions).
101. See City of New York v. Stone, 782 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (finding disbursement of food stamps to illegal immigrants a violation of
Section 411).
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In contrast, the California Court of Appeals reasoned in
County of Alameda v. Agustin102 that the state’s order requiring
child support payments and the state’s provision of child support
collection services to an illegal immigrant are not “state or local
public benefit[s].”103 Child support payments and child support
collection services, the court reasoned, are not similar to any of
the benefits listed in Section 411(c)(1)(B).104 The court found this
dissimilarity because the source of child support payments
ordered by the state was ultimately private.105 More importantly,
the court distinguished child support services provided by the
state from the other benefits listed in Section 411(c)(1)(B):
The benefits specifically listed in section 1621 . . . are all either
direct income support payments or services intended to meet
the daily needs of disadvantaged persons. Significantly, such
payments and services are continuing, or potentially
continuing benefits, intended to provide ongoing public
support for the recipients as long as required. Child support
collection services are quite different . . . these services are
intended to help recipients support themselves . . . child
support collection services return to the local agency
considerably more funds than they cost.106

The court in Rajeh v. Steel City Corporation107 similarly
found workers’ compensation funds outside the definition of
“state or local public benefit” because workers’ compensation
“operates as a balance of mutual compromise between the
interests of the employer and the employee,”108 in contrast to the
listed benefits, which “are either means for the government to
assist people with economic hardships until they are able to
financially manage on their own . . . or are an earned benefit,
102. No. A115092, 2007 WL 2759474, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2007).
103. Id.
104. See id. (explaining that child support services and payments fall
outside the definition of “state or local public benefit”).
105. See id. (“Child support payments clearly do not fall into this
category . . . they are payments made by private individuals. The fact that the
County might assist in their collection does not change the private source of the
payments.”).
106. Id.
107. 813 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
108. Id. at 707.
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such as retirement.”109 Thus, these courts drew a distinction
between benefits that are direct, need-based payments aimed at
public support and benefits that aim to increase self-sufficiency
through indirect state support. Like reduced tuition, both child
support payments and services and workers’ compensation funds
derive from an amalgam of sources, not directly from the state.
3. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411 Is Inconsistent
with Congressional Intent
Construing Section 411 as an impediment to reduced tuition
is also inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting
PRWORA. Congress codified its purpose: to further national
immigration policy emphasizing self-sufficiency, such that “aliens
within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to
meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and
resources.”110 Access to higher education through reduced tuition,
a situation in which the student is contributing financial
resources and receiving no direct payment from the state, is an
important means to this self-sufficiency. As the Supreme Court
has long noted, “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant
and self-sufficient participants in society.”111 Education is
“providing the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives,”112 thereby promoting reliance on
individual capability rather than public resources. Limiting
access to education in this way, then, violates Congress’s intent to
promote self-sufficiency because it confines what the law views as
fundamental to accomplish both self-reliance and productive
participation in society.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1601(1)–(2) (2012).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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4. Denying Reduced Tuition Under Section 411 Is Inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s View of Public Education
The Court has uniquely valued public education and
explicitly distinguished it from other types of social welfare,
particularly in two bellwether cases. In Plyler v. Doe,113 the
Supreme Court recognized the value of providing fundamental
education, even to children in the United States illegally.114
Considering both a Texas statute withholding funds from local
public districts for the primary and secondary education of
children not legally admitted into the United States and a
particular school district’s attempt to charge such students
tuition, Plyler underscored the consequences of denying a public
education to undocumented students.115
First, the Court recognized lax enforcement of immigration
laws produced a substantial population of illegal immigrants,
which “raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented
resident aliens, encouraged by some reason to remain here as a
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that
our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.”116
This possibility, the Court reasoned, “presents most difficult
problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles
of equality under law.”117 In addition, the Court noted, though all
persons in the country unlawfully are subject to deportation,
“there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever
be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal
permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to

113. See id. In Plyler, the Court examined the claim that the Texas statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 202. The Court determined that the
Equal Protection Clause extends even to those in the United States illegally. Id.
at 210–12. The Court concluded Texas did not demonstrate any legitimate state
interest served by instituting this statute, and the law, therefore, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 224–30.
114. See id. at 230 (“It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of
the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”).
115. See id. at 202 (describing the Texas statute under consideration).
116. Id. at 218–19.
117. Id. at 219.
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become a citizen.”118 Because deportation is discretionary with
the federal government, a state cannot determine with certainty
that an undocumented child will absolutely be deported, and “[i]t
would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of
education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to
remain.”119 It is Congress, the Court noted, that possesses
plenary authority over immigration; the state may only act when
its action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate
state goal, and even the judiciary greatly defers to Congress.120
Second, the Court also noted that because of the critically
important nature of public education, putting this entire class of
individuals under the enduring disability of unequal education
violates well-settled principles governing the nature of education:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.121

It is this importance, the Court reasoned, that indicates
education is not “merely some governmental ‘benefit’
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”122 Rather, it is of “supreme importance,”123 and
critical to society, because “[w]e cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied
the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests.”124 The enduring disability imposed on this particular
class by denial of education to children brought illegally into the
country by their parents is unwarranted, according to the Court:
“the children who are plaintiffs . . . can affect neither their
118. Id. at 226.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 226 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 351 (1976)),
superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
121. Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
122. Id. at 221.
123. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1920).
124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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parents’ conduct nor their own status.”125 Though undocumented
status is the product of concededly unlawful action and therefore
not an absolutely immutable characteristic, burdening these
children with the conduct of adults “does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice.”126 Given this, the Court
found that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the State
hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries.”127
Because of the unique status of education and the
entrustment of immigration power to the federal government, the
Court found no sufficient justification to withhold education
without clear indication from Congress that national immigration
policy intends it:
We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to
withhold from those children, for so long as they are present in
this country . . . access to a basic education. In other contexts,
undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal
policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the
treatment of undocumented aliens. But in the area of special
constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the
absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the
present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that
supports the State in denying these children an elementary
education.128

Thus, Plyler prevented the state from eroding congressional
immigration policy by limiting access to education without clear
congressional approval because education is, by its nature,
fundamentally distinct from other social benefits.
Though Plyler speaks of primary and secondary education,
the Court, in Grutter v. Bollinger,129 recognized the value of
125. Id. at 220.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 230.
128. Id. at 226.
129. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003) (“We have
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for
work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our political
and cultural heritage’ . . . . For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible
to all individuals.” (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221)).
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educational access existing more keenly in public higher
education. Grutter noted that “the diffusion of knowledge and
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”130
Further, “[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and
available to all segments of American society . . . represents a
paramount government objective,” and “nowhere is the
importance of such openness more acute than in the context of
higher education.”131 The Court concluded that “[a]ll members of
our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training.”132 Grutter thus repeats the quintessence of Plyler by
underlining the essential social value of access and openness in
postsecondary education.
Ambiguity consumes Section 411, and presumptively
aligning reduced tuition with the social welfare benefits listed in
Section 411 thus strays from the clear line drawn by the Court to
divide such access to education from social welfare benefits.133
Interpreting this uncertainty to functionally deny public
education collaterally undercuts Plyler and Grutter by
disregarding the search for clear congressional intent before
imposing such a disability. As noted in Plyler, there is no
guarantee of deportation until it occurs, and the state has no
justifiable interest in creating an undereducated subclass by
denying an essential postsecondary education. Including reduced
tuition as a prohibited benefit under Section 411, then, hastily
distorts the language of the statute, discounts congressional
intent, and neglects the Supreme Court’s high regard for
openness in public education.

130. Id. at 331.
131. Id. at 331–32 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
132. Id. at 332.
133. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the uncertainty in Section 411).

2370

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2339 (2013)
IV. Federal Courts Will Not Hear a Section 411 Claim

There is no indication that any federal agency has taken
enforcement action under either Section 505 or Section 411.134 As
such, private lawsuits remain an appealing avenue for
enforcement proceedings,135 but nonjusticiability in federal court
further complicates the interpretive hitch to Section 411: federal
courts will likely never hear a claim from a private plaintiff under
Section 411. First, the statute itself carries no private right of
action.136 Second, a private plaintiff is limited both by a state
university’s immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment
and by the lack of a particularized injury to support standing.137
Finally, constitutional claims to tuition classifications are only
successful in limited circumstances, none of which are present
here.138

134. See Brief in Opposition at 27, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 10-1029 (Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (noting that no agency has enforced these
provisions). In addition, the Washington Legal Foundation filed formal
complaints with DHS in 2005 requesting enforcement action under Section 505;
to date, no action has been taken. See Case Detail: In re In-State Tuition for
Illegal Aliens, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.wlf.org/litigating/case_detail.
asp?id=366 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (noting the lack of DHS action) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing
plaintiff’s federal law challenge to a state’s in-state tuition law for a lack of
standing and lack of private right of action); Anthony Cotton, Tom Tancredo
Group Plans Suit Over Immigrant Tuition at Metro, DENVER POST (June 27,
2012),
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20945697/tom-tancredogroup-plans-suit-over-immigrant-tuition (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (discussing
an imminent lawsuit in Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). To date, no federal court has heard a challenge on the merits to a
policy granting in-state tuition to undocumented students.
136. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the lack of a private right of action
under Section 411).
137. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the sovereign immunity limitations to a
Section 411 suit).
138. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the likely failure of constitutional
challenges to tuition classifications).

THE PROMISE OF PLYLER

2371

A. Statutory Enforcement of Personal Rights
1. Implied Private Rights of Action and § 1983 Claims
A plaintiff may attempt to enforce the statutory right under
the statute itself or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides
redress for deprivation of rights under color of law,139 but neither
provides real answer to an aggrieved plaintiff. The “fact that a
federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does
not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of
that person.”140 For a private plaintiff to sue under the provisions
of Section 411, then, there must be an implied private right of
action in its provisions. A § 1983 analysis differs in that, although
the statute must still carry a private right of action, it need not
carry a private remedy because § 1983 itself carries one, which
Congress has explicitly authorized in the statutory text.141
Determining whether a private right exists at all, however, does
not differ in its analysis in actions seeking relief through an
implied private right of action or under § 1983.142 In other words,
if there is no clear evidence Congress intends to create new
individual rights under a statute, “there is no basis for a private
suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied private right of
action.”143 If there is clear evidence Congress intended to create a
private right under a federal statute, that right is presumptively

139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
140. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 668 (1979).
141. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002) (describing the
difference between a § 1983 analysis and an implied private right of action
analysis).
142. See id. (“A court’s role in discerning whether personal rights exist in
the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role in discerning whether
personal rights exist in the implied right of action context.” (citation omitted)).
143. Id. at 286.
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enforceable under § 1983, but it may not be enforceable under the
terms of the statute without indication of a remedy.144
In determining whether there is an implied private right of
action, the Supreme Court focuses on congressional intent.145 As
such, the finding of a private right of action depends primarily on
the construction of the statute itself.146 Importantly, the statute
must demonstrate congressional intent in explicit rights-creating
terms.147 The text must be “phrased in terms of the person
benefited,”148 with an “unmistakable focus on the benefited
class.”149 In addition, even if the statute has such rights-creating
terms, the plaintiff still must show intent to “create not just a
private right, but also a private remedy.”150 Consequently,
because of separation of powers concerns and judicial hesitancy to
make law without clear congressional authorization, courts rarely
find implied private rights of action.151
144. See id. (discussing the requirements of an implied private right of
action and § 1983 claims).
145. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (noting
congressional intent is the most important factor in a private right of action
analysis). The Court’s analysis formerly focused on a four-part test:
(1) legislative intent; (2) the consistency of the remedy with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme; (3) whether the plaintiff was a member of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; and (4) whether the cause of
action is one traditionally relegated to state law. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 66
(1975) (outlining the test for implied private right of action cases), overruling
recognized by Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash
analysis in [Touche Ross].”). The Court now focuses on congressional intent,
treating the other factors as indicia of that intent. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at
575
[T]he Court did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to
equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause
of action . . . the first three factors . . . are ones traditionally relied
upon in determining legislative intent.
146. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (“The question of the existence of a
statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.”).
147. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2002) (requiring the statute
contain language showing enforceable rights).
148. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 668, 692 n.13 (1979).
149. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
150. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (emphases added).
151. See id. at 286 (“Without [statutory intent], a cause of action does not
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2. Application to Other Cases Indicates No Implied Private Right
of Action Under Section 411
Because the analysis used when searching for a personal
right is the same whether the court is looking for an implied
private right of action in the statute itself or a private right of
action under § 1983, precedent considering both private rights of
action and § 1983 is relevant. Generally, these cases examine
whether various statutes evince congressional intent to confer a
private right of action. For example, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,152 the Supreme Court found that Title IX of the 1972
Education Act Amendments to the Higher Education Act,153 in
mirroring Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,154 carried an
implied private right of action. In relevant part, Title IX reads:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”155 Because Congress
intended both statutes to prevent the use of federal funds to
support discriminatory programs and to “provide individual
citizens effective protection against [these] practices,”156 only a
private right of action could accomplish the latter.157 Thus, the
exist, and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a
policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”); see also Lisa E. Key,
Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme
Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 283, 294–96 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court rulings on implied
private rights of action); Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI’s
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 353–57 (2001) (noting the
Supreme Court rarely finds implied private rights of action).
152. 441 U.S. 677, 668 (1979).
153. Higher Education Act of 1965, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219,
amended by Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012)). Much of Cannon’s
reasoning stems from Title IX’s similarity to Title VI, for which many lower
courts had already found a private right of action and remedy. See Cannon, 441
U.S. at 694–98 (discussing the history of Title IX’s similarities to Title VI).
154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
155. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
156. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
157. See id. at 706 (discussing the legislature’s purpose in enacting Title IX).
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Court found sufficient congressional intent to find a private cause
of action. The Court noted158 several examples of statutory rightscreating language that implicate a private cause of action—“no
person shall be denied the right to vote”;159 “[e]mployees shall
have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives”;160 “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have
the same right.”161 In each example, a right is conferred directly
on a class of persons, demonstrating sufficient congressional
intent.
Gonzaga v. Doe162 demonstrates nonrights-creating language.
In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court concluded the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)163 lacked personal
rights-conveying language in its nondisclosure of educational
records provisions.164 The statute under consideration reads “[n]o
funds shall be made available under any applicable program to
any educational agency or institution which has a policy or
practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of
students without the written consent of their parents to any
individual, agency, or organization.”165 Gonzaga reasoned that
FERPA did not convey personal rights either under the statute
itself or § 1983 because it had no rights-creating language,
addressed itself to the Secretary of Education rather than
individuals on whom it purportedly conferred enforceable rights,
and employed a focus on institutional policy and practice, rather
than on individual instances of disclosure.166 Gonzaga
distinguished the rights-creating text of Title IX from the
nonrights-creating text of FERPA because Title IX used
158. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)
(discussing examples of rights-creating language).
159. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969).
160. Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210,
213 (1944).
161. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).
162. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012).
164. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276 (discussing the FERPA claims at issue).
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1).
166. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287–89 (finding no personal right under
FERPA).
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“individually focused terminology” such as “[n]o person shall,”
while FERPA speaks only to the Secretary of Education,
“directing that ‘[n]o funds shall be made available.’”167 This focus
is “two steps removed” from the interests of individual
students.168
Similarly, in Day v. Bond,169 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found no private right of action under Section 505
of IIRIRA.170 The Tenth Circuit found the text lacked rightscreating language showing congressional intent, reasoning that
the provision imposed a “limit on the authority of postsecondary
educational institutions” rather than affording a benefit to an
individual.171 Further, the provision “addresses itself to the
institutions affected and their authority to provide benefits to
illegal aliens, not to the class of nonresident citizens who
incidentally benefit from its provisions.”172 “The focus is [a step]
removed from the interests of individual students and parents
and clearly does not confer the sort of ‘individual entitlement’
that is enforceable under § 1983” or an implied private right of
action.173 Like FERPA in Gonzaga, the Tenth Circuit reasoned,
the provision here speaks to institutional policy and practice and
employs an aggregate focus that cannot “give rise to individual
rights.”174

167. Id. at 287.
168. Id.
169. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012); see also supra Part III.A (examining Section 505
of IIRIRA). Section 505 reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not
lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis
of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education
benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for
such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without
regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1623.
171. See Day, 500 F.3d at 1139 (finding that the statute lacked requisite
congressional intent).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id. (citations omitted).
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Day further noted, but did not decide, that other provisions
in the immigration code may be similarly limited.175 In 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1), the statute provides that “[t]he Secretary of
Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and
enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens.”176 The Tenth Circuit
viewed this provision, combined with the lack of rights-creating
language in Section 505 itself, as further evidence that Congress
contemplated federal, not private, enforcement.177
3. The Text of Section 411 Indicates No Private Right of Action
Like IIRIRA Section 505, PRWORA Section 411 frames its
prohibition by limiting the authority of institutions to provide
specified benefits to illegal aliens.178 Section 411 provides that an
unqualified alien “is not eligible for any State or local public
benefit.”179 In addressing itself to institutions rather than
individual citizens who may incidentally benefit from the
prohibitions, Section 411 lacks the rights-creating language and
individually focused terminology that suggest congressional
intent to impose a private right of action. As in Gonzaga,
Section 411 speaks to institutional policy and practice, directing
that institutions not make benefits available to unqualified
aliens.180 The provision confers no specific right directly on a class
of persons. Further, as in Day, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) suggests
administration and enforcement of the provision lies with DHS,
not with private citizens.181 Combined with the lack of rights-

175. See id. (“We do not conclude that private rights are not conferred under
other provisions of the immigration code.”).
176. Id.
177. See id. (discussing § 1103(a)(1) in combination with § 1623).
178. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (providing that an unqualified alien “is
not eligible for any State or local public benefit”), with id. § 1623 (“[A]n alien
who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis
of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education benefit.”).
179. Id. § 1621.
180. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text (discussing Gonzaga).
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
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creating language in Section 411 itself, it seems Congress did not
intend private enforcement.
B. Sovereign Immunity and Standing Limitations
A private plaintiff suing a state university in federal court
will also be limited by the state university’s sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state.”182 The Supreme Court has held this bars
private citizen suits against state governments in federal and
state court without their consent.183 With some exceptions, state
universities are considered arms of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.184
In Ex Parte Young,185 the Court limited the sovereign
immunity doctrine by allowing a state official to be sued in
federal court for ongoing violation of federal law as long as the
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
183. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (finding that state
governments maintain their sovereignty in both federal and state courts for
claims arising under federal law).
184. See Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an Affirmative-Action
Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85, 91–97 (2012) (noting state universities are
generally arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes). The Supreme
Court has never directly spoken on whether a state university is an arm of the
state. See Kelly Knivila, Public Universities and the Eleventh Amendment, 78
GEO. L.J. 1723, 1726 n.12 (1990) (describing the lack of Supreme Court
precedent on this question). Whether a state university is an “arm of the state”
for sovereign immunity purposes is often a question of state law and the
financial independence afforded to the university; however, most courts still
conclude that a state university is an arm of the state. See, e.g., Lewis v. Univ. of
Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding
the university was an arm of the state); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 546–50 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding the University of Iowa
immune as a state agency).
185. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the Court concluded that a state official
enforcing an unconstitutional legislative enactment is in conflict with the
authority of the Constitution, and therefore “stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct.” Id. at 159.
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state is not the real party in interest.186 The state is considered
the real party in interest, however, when the “action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state,”187 in which case the
state is entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity even if the nominal defendants are state officials.
Recently, the Court reiterated the force of Young by confirming
courts need only determine whether “[the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.”188 An action permitted by Young,
then, requires prospective relief; the state cannot be sued for
retrospective damages without its consent.189 Though the Court
recently found no bar to a state suing itself,190 sovereign
immunity remains prohibitive for a private plaintiff suing an arm
of the state.
A private plaintiff, then, would be limited to prospective
injunctive relief and prohibited from seeking retrospective
damages, and it is unclear what injunctive relief a private
plaintiff would have standing to pursue. Article III standing
requires a plaintiff in federal court to show concrete and
particularized injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the
injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that the
186. See id. (allowing a state official to be sued in federal court for ongoing
violations of federal law); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 101 (1984) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials
when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” (citations omitted)).
187. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of State of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464
(1945); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (confirming the
state is effectively the real party in interest if the suit is one for payment from
the state treasury).
188. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)
(citation omitted).
189. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 676 (“[A] federal court’s remedial power,
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the
payment of funds from the state treasury.” (citations omitted)).
190. Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2010).
In Stewart, the Court permitted a suit by a state agency against another state
agency, finding it no different than a private plaintiff suing the state agency.
See id. (“[T]he limits we have recognized reflect the principle that ‘the general
criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect
of the relief sought.’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 107 (1984))).
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injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.191 An out-of-state
resident suing to enforce Section 411 would have to show ongoing
threat of future injury. First, no such plaintiff could show that
any money spent on an undocumented student would go to him
but for the violative policy—an out-of-state resident would never
receive in-state tuition regardless of whether undocumented
students receive in-state tuition. Further, a claim that future outof-state students shoulder any financial burden for the tuition
reduction for undocumented students is, at best, a speculative
showing when university operating revenue is a mix of funds
generally employed for the benefit of all students.192 The Tenth
Circuit similarly rejected out-of-state resident Equal Protection
Clause challenges to an in-state tuition policy for lack of standing
because the injuries were too speculative, could not be attributed
to the university’s in-state tuition policy, and were not
redressable by the court because these plaintiffs would never
receive in-state tuition.193
C. Constitutional Claims
A constitutional challenge under Section 411 similarly lacks
force. First, though the provision could implicate the Equal
Protection Clause,194 the Supreme Court has rejected Equal
Protection Clause challenges to residency-based tuition
classifications provided the classification is uniformly applied and
based on physical presence and intent to remain.195 The Court
191. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting
that the irreducible constitutional minimum for standing is injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability).
192. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the sources of
university operating revenue); see also Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132–35
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing).
193. See Day, 500 F.3d at 1132–35 (dismissing the case for lack of standing).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
195. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325–33 (1983) (permitting
residency-based tuition classifications); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text (discussing challenges to tuition classifications).
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placed certain limits on tuition classifications, including
prohibiting an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence.196 The
Court recognized the state’s legitimate interest in giving
preferential treatment to bona fide residents.197 In other words,
the tuition classification alone is not a constitutional violation.
Further, as in Day, plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims
would struggle to show a sufficiently particularized personal
stake to demonstrate standing.198 Because every challenge to instate tuition rates for undocumented students is restricted by the
aforementioned justiciability obstacles, there is no indication any
federal court would ever reach any constitutional question.
V. A Possible Challenge: State Attorney General Enforcement of
Section 411 Under State Consumer Protection Law
Because Section 411 carries no private right of action and
faces sovereign immunity and standing issues, it is unlikely a
private plaintiff could successfully maintain a lawsuit in federal
court under Section 411. State courts, however, bear no
comparable constraint. As such, enforcement of, for example, a
state consumer protection law incorporating Section 411 as an
ingredient presents a legitimate vehicle for attempted
enforcement. The importance of consumer protection in education
is on the rise. First, the surge of the for-profit education sector199
196. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (finding an irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidence violative of the Due Process Clause). In Vlandis,
the state of Connecticut established a student’s residency for tuition purposes
conclusively and irreversibly at the time of admission. Id. at 443. The Court
found that denying a student the opportunity to present evidence of residency
because of a presumption of nonresidency violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
197. See id. at 453 (recognizing a state has a legitimate interest in
maintaining the quality of its public institutions and treating its residents
preferentially).
198. See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132–35 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing
claims from out-of-state residents under the Equal Protection Clause for lack of
standing); supra Part IV.B (discussing lack of standing).
199. For-profit education generally refers to schools that operate for profit
and typically offer programs with job-specific training, such as secretarial school
or cosmetology school. See Patrick F. Linehan, Note, Dreams Protected: A New
Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools’ Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753,
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and the rapid increase in federal and state aid to such
institutions200 in the past decade brought heightened attention to
aggressive recruiting and marketing tactics.201 This attention
brings stories of fraud, misrepresentation, and manipulation of
consumers, which have not escaped the focus of federal and state
leaders, and state attorneys general have initiated investigations
into these tactics.202 For example, Kentucky Attorney General
Jack Conway filed a state lawsuit in July 2011 alleging Daymar
College, a for-profit college, deceived and misled students.203
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a similar lawsuit
against Westwood College in 2012, claiming the college
misrepresented its criminal justice program.204
Although the for-profit sector currently bears the burden of
this attention, the spirit signals a shift toward increasing
protection of consumers and their investment in higher education
at a time when students are increasingly borrowing more money
and increasingly defaulting on their loans.205 In this context,
756 (2001) (describing the nature of proprietary schools); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 600.5 (2012) (defining “proprietary institution of higher education” for federal
student aid purposes).
200. See THOMAS L. HARNISCH, AM. ASSOC. OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVS.,
CHANGING DYNAMICS IN STATE OVERSIGHT AT FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES 2 (2012),
http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/P
olicyPublications/Policy_Matters/Changing%20Dynamics%20in%20State%20Ov
ersight%20of%20For-Profit%20Colleges.pdf (describing the increase in for-profit
education).
201. See Linehan, supra note 199, at 756–63 (describing the recruiting and
marketing tactics of proprietary schools).
202. See id. at 763–74 (discussing misrepresentation and manipulation at
proprietary schools). See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES
ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING
PRACTICES (2010) (discussing examples of fraud uncovered in a GAO
investigation into for-profit colleges).
203. See HARNISCH, supra note 200, at 4 (discussing the state attorney
general investigation into Daymar College).
204. See id. (describing the state attorney general lawsuit against Westwood
College).
205. See National Student Loan Two-Year Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/
defaultrates.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (listing national cohort default
rates since 1987) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Department of Education measures default rates as the percentage of borrowers
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then, any college or university, including a state public
university, could reasonably expect scrutiny for its treatment of
consumers.
A. Consumer Protection Law Generally
Consumer protection law in the United States is a
combination of federal and state law.206 The Federal Trade
Commission enforces the primary federal consumer protection
statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which
prohibits unfair or deceptive business practices that affect
commerce.207 In addition, numerous federal laws regulate specific
industries.208 Like their federal counterparts, state consumer
protection laws prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices.209
Though they vary considerably from state to state, there are some
consistent themes. First, each state’s general consumer protection
act is typically some version of the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices Statute (UDAP).210 Most prohibit false, unfair, or
deceptive trade practices and confer enforcement power on the
state attorney general.211 Substantively, many states simply
include a general prohibition against deceptive and unfair
conduct, though some states list specific prohibited conduct.212
who enter repayment in a fiscal year and default by the end of the next fiscal
year. Id. The most recently issued national default rate (for fiscal year 2010)
was 9.1%—a steady increase from 5.9% in fiscal year 2000. Id.
206. See Edward M. Crane, Nicholas J. Eichenseer & Emma S. Glazer, U.S.
Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 305, 306
(2011) (discussing the nature of consumer protection law in the United States).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
208. See, e.g., Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (prohibiting any
one institution from acting as any combination of investment bank, commercial
bank, or insurance company); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301–399 (regulating the safety and marketing of food).
209. See Crane, supra note 206, at 326 (describing state consumer protection
laws).
210. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2009) (discussing the UDAP statutes).
211. See Crane, supra note 206, at 327 (explaining commonalities among
state consumer protection laws).
212. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., supra note 210, at 11 (discussing
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Most state statutes do not require proof the wrongdoer had
fraudulent knowledge or intent.213 Most states do require a
private plaintiff show he relied on the false representations
associated with the deceptive practice.214 States often exercise
these powers consistently with their federal counterparts.215
Critically, unlike the federal consumer protection statutes, state
UDAP statutes confer a private right of action; with some
exception, they allow consumer lawsuits for actual damages,
injunctive relief, and, in some states, punitive damages.216
B. Relationship to Violations of Federal Law in Higher Education
When a student enrolls in a state public university, that
student is relying on the school’s representations. With most
universities, that student is relying on, for example, the
institution’s accreditation. An accrediting agency217 is a
nongovernmental educational association that ensures the
quality of education or training offered by the institutions or
programs they accredit, as well as the financial and
prohibited practices under UDAP statutes).
213. See Consumer Protection Handbook, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAW
71 (discussing the scope of state consumer protection statutes).
214. See id. at 72 (explaining the reliance requirement).
215. See Crane, supra note 206, at 327 (“[T]he FTC and state enforcement
officials often coordinate their efforts in the areas of consumer education,
identity theft, telemarketing, and other national consumer protection issues.”).
216. See id. (expressing the conferral of a private right of action under
UDAP statute).
217. Public universities are generally accredited at the institutional level by
one of six regional accreditors: Middle States Commission on Higher Education,
the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, the North Central
Association of Colleges and Schools of the Higher Learning Commission, the
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, the Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools, or the Western Association of Schools and Colleges
Accrediting Commission. See generally COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC.
ACCREDITATION (CHEA), RECOGNIZED ACCREDITING ORGANIZATIONS (AS OF
SEPTEMBER 2012), http://www.chea.org/pdf/CHEA_USDE_AllAccred.pdf (listing
the regional accrediting agencies). In addition, other accrediting agencies can be
either institutional or programmatic, the latter authorizing only specific
programs such as law or medicine. See CHEA, THE VALUE OF ACCREDITATION 2
(2010), http://www.chea.org/pdf/Value%20of%20US%20Accreditation%2006.29.2
010_buttons.pdf (describing the nature of accrediting agencies).
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administrative integrity.218 To this end, accrediting agencies
employ a complex set of standards and requirements for
institutions seeking accreditation, and institutions seeking to
maintain already-acquired accreditation.219 Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965,220 which makes available various federal
loan and grant programs to students, requires an institution be
accredited to participate.221 The U.S. Department of Education,
which administers Title IV, does not itself accredit universities as
a condition of Title IV eligibility; rather, the Secretary publishes
a list of reliable accreditors and defers to those accreditors on
questions of institutional quality to determine Title IV
eligibility.222
Accreditation, then, is valuable to both an institution and its
students. First, it is an assurance of the quality of the education
offered—a lack of accreditation often indicates a lack of quality.
Accordingly, a student’s degree is more valuable from an
accredited institution than an unaccredited institution. Second, it
is the key to a major source of revenue for both institutions and
students: federal student aid. Without accreditation, an
institution and its students lose access to federal loans and
grants.223
Accreditation standards broadly require integrity, and often
explicitly require compliance with federal and state law to attain
218. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2012) (explaining why the Secretary of Education
approves accrediting agencies).
219. See generally MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: REQUIREMENTS OF
AFFILIATION AND STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION (2006), http://www.msche.org/
publications/CHX-2011-WEB.pdf (detailing requirements for accreditation).
220. Higher Education Act of 1965, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099 (2012)).
221. See 34 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(5)(i) (2012) (defining an institution of higher
education as accredited). Accredited means “[t]he status of public recognition
that a nationally recognized accrediting agency grants to an institution or
educational program that meets the agency’s established requirements.” Id.
§ 600.2.
222. See Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last
updated Sept. 20, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.
html#Overview (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the role of accrediting
agencies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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that integrity. For example, the Middle States Commission on
Higher Education (Middle States) requires every institution
“compl[y] with all applicable government (usually Federal and
state) policies, regulations, and requirements.”224 The New
England Association of Schools and Colleges requires institutions
to “observe the spirit as well as the letter of applicable legal
requirements.”225 The Higher Learning Commission of the North
Central Association requires “the organization understand[] and
abide[] by local, state, and federal laws and regulations applicable
to it.”226 Integrity within the accreditation context, then,
encompasses compliance with any and all applicable law. An
egregious example of breach of this integrity by violating federal
law arose in 2012, when Middle States warned Pennsylvania
State University (Penn State) that its accreditation was in
jeopardy for the university’s failure to comply with federal and
state law in connection with the Jerry Sandusky scandal.227
Because Section 411 lacks decisive interpretive guidance, a
state public university granting in-state tuition to illegal
immigrants risks violation of Section 411. If that university is
found to violate Section 411, it is in violation of federal law,
224. MIDDLE STATES COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., supra note 219, at xii.
225. NEW ENGLAND ASS’N OF SCH. AND COLLS., STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION
(2011),
http://cihe.neasc.org/standards_policies/standards/standards_html_ver
sion#standard_eleven (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
226. HIGHER LEARNING COMM’N OF THE N. CENTRAL ASS’N, COMMISSION
POLICIES 16 (2012), available at http://www.ncahlc.org/Policy/commissionpolicies.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
227. See Letter from R. Barbara Gitenstein, Chair, Middle States Comm’n
on Higher Educ. Exec. Comm., to Dr. Rodney A. Erickson, President, The Pa.
State Univ. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.psu.edu/vpaa/pdfs/middle%20states/
middle_states_notification_8-6-12.pdf (notifying Penn State its accreditation
was in jeopardy based on the university’s failure to comply with applicable
government policies in the Jerry Sandusky scandal). The university’s
accreditation was later reinstated following institutional self-studies and the
implementation of new procedures. See Laura Nichols, Middle States Takes
Penn State off ‘Warning List,’ Accreditation Intact, STATECOLLEGE.COM (Nov. 16,
2012), http://www.statecollege.com/news/local-news/middle-states-takes-pennstate-off-warning-list-accreditation-intact-1182146/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(describing the removal of Penn State’s accreditation warning) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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breaching the integrity of the institution, and consequently
risking its accreditation. A university risking its accreditation is
risking the value of a degree from its institution—a degree from
an unaccredited university is worth less than a degree from an
accredited university. If a student enrolls believing a university is
accredited and consciously maintaining its accreditation, a
knowing violation of federal law that risks that accreditation
would markedly betray the expectations of that student. In other
words, representation that a university is an accredited
institution inheres a representation of ongoing compliance with
federal law; risking violation of Section 411 corrupts this
representation.
C. The State Attorney General as an Enforcement Mechanism
With some variation, enforcement of a consumer protection
statute can occur in two ways: (1) the state attorney general can
institute an investigation and civil lawsuit against an offender, or
(2) a private plaintiff can sue the offender for violating the
consumer protection law. Attorneys general are uniquely situated
law officers. First, in forty-three states, the attorney general is a
popularly elected official.228 Though state constitutions and
statutes define the responsibilities of attorneys general, state
attorneys general may usually exercise their power and authority
as the public interest requires.229 As such, state attorneys general
often have the ability to defend or challenge state agency actions
in court, even though the state agency is often the attorney
general’s client.230 When state attorneys general decide to
228. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role
of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998,
2002 (2001) (discussing the election of the state attorneys general).
229. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 271 (5th
Cir. 1976) (“The Attorney General has the power and it is his duty among the
many devolving upon him by the common law to prosecute all actions necessary
for the protection and defense of the property and the revenue of the state.”
(quotations omitted)).
230. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 57 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross, eds., 2d ed. 2007)
(describing the relationship of the state attorneys general to state agencies).
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challenge agency action they find unlawful, however, they will
often appoint special counsel to represent the agency.231 Because
the state attorneys general are charged with enforcement and
protection of the public good, they often have broader
enforcement power than the available consumer remedies.232
The state attorneys general are thus in the ideal position to
force interpretation of this statute under state consumer
protection law. First, given the increasing value placed on
consumer protection in education,233 state attorneys general may
take increasing notice of potential violations. Public universities
are devised as operating in the public good, “promot[ing] the
general welfare of the citizenry,”234 and “dedicated to the service
of [the state] and its people.”235 Public universities, then, are
uniquely situated in a position of public scrutiny; as such, their
integrity is paramount. As the chief law enforcement officer in
the state, the state attorney general aims to protect the integrity
of public universities and the interests of state consumers
through the enforcement of state consumer protection laws, even
against another state agency in the same state. Potentially
violating federal law and consequently risking accreditation poses
a major hazard to the expectations of consumers—a degree from a
school that represented itself as an accredited institution but
ends up unaccredited is a much different investment than a
degree from a school that complies with federal law and
maintains its accreditation.
231. See id. at 58 (“In situations where the Attorney General believes the
agency’s actions conflict with the public interest, the Attorney General may
appoint special counsel for the agency and seek to protect the public interest
through intervention in the suit or institution of separate proceedings against
the agency.”).
232. See Consumer Protection Handbook, supra note 213, at 81–83
(describing the enforcement capabilities of state attorneys general).
233. See supra Part V (discussing the increased role of consumer protection
law in education).
234. Mission and Public Character, PA. ST. UNIV., http://www.psu.edu/thisis-penn-state/leadership-and-mission/mission-and-character (last visited Nov.
10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. History & Mission, UNIV. OF N.C., http://www.northcarolina.edu/
about/mission.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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Because federal nonjusticiability plagues Section 411, then,
the statute is only justiciable as an element of a state law claim.
In this regard, the state attorney general, charged with the
enforcement of consumer protection statutes, could feasibly force
a court to consider the statute to protect consumer investment in
education by interpreting Section 411 at a time when student
borrowing and debt is climbing. Because of the unique position of
state attorneys general and the availability of a state forum,
challenging Section 411 under state consumer protection law is a
viable passage.
VI. Conclusion
Section 411 presents no bar to institutional policy providing
in-state tuition to undocumented students. First, in-state tuition
is not a benefit contemplated by the provision’s prohibition.
Second, no private plaintiff can sue under the provision itself
because it lacks a private right of action, is limited by the
university’s sovereign immunity, and does not have a legitimate
constitutional issue. The rights encompassed by Section 411 are
only justiciable as an ingredient of a state law issue, which may
be a viable claim under state consumer protection law.

